Sheriar Khan and Nicholas Zeolla
May 2026
A Highly Commended entry in the SCL’s Hudson Prize, published in the SCL Journal: Spring 2026
This paper explores what constitutes a ‘dwelling’ for the purposes of the Defective Premises Act 1972, addressing both the ordinary meaning of the word in non-DPA cases and how this definition has been modified for the purposes of the DPA, including the approach outlined in the Uratemp and Rendlesham Estates cases. The ambiguity around the definition presents potential defences to claims under the extended limitation period of the Building Safety Act on the basis that the building in question is not a dwelling and does not comprise individual dwellings. The authors test those potential defences with the examples of shared student accommodation and care homes. They conclude that it is for the courts to provide an answer of what constitutes a ‘dwelling’ that can be applied in practice by the construction industry.
I. Natural and ordinary meaning of ‘dwelling’ – II. Statutory context of the Defective Premises Act 1972 – III. Shared student accommodation and care homes – IV. Buildings comprising individual dwellings? – Natural and ordinary meaning/the Uratemp approach – The object of the DPA – Commercial or industrial premises –Exclusive possession – Residential units in the BSA – V. Conclusion
The authors: Sheriar Khan and Nicholas Zeolla are barristers practising from Atkin Chambers
Text: 14 pages